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a b s t r a c t 
Year in and year out the increasing adaptivity of offenders has maintained ransomware’s position as a 
major cybersecurity threat. The cybersecurity industry has responded with a similar degree of adaptive- 
ness, but has focussed more upon technical (science) than ‘non-technical’ (social science) factors. This 
article explores empirically how organisations and investigators have reacted to the shift in the ran- 
somware landscape from scareware and locker attacks to the almost exclusive use of crypto-ransomware. 
We outline how, for various reasons, victims and investigators struggle to respond effectively to this form 
of threat. By drawing upon in-depth interviews with victims and law enforcement officers involved in 
twenty-six crypto-ransomware attacks between 2014 and 2018 and using an inductive content analysis 
method, we develop a data-driven taxonomy of crypto-ransomware countermeasures. The findings of the 
research indicate that responses to crypto-ransomware are made more complex by the nuanced rela- 
tionship between the technical (malware which encrypts) and the human (social engineering which still 
instigates most infections) aspects of an attack. As a consequence, there is no simple technological ‘sil- 
ver bullet’ that will wipe out the crypto-ransomware threat. Rather, a multi-layered approach is needed 
which consists of socio-technical measures, zealous front-line managers and active support from senior 
management. 
Crown Copyright © 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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0. Introduction 
In a world of cloud-driven computing, many businesses and or-
anisations now rely wholly upon their IT and data systems to
unction effectively, to the point that “IT services are becoming a
ritical infrastructure, much like roads, electricity, tap water and
nancial services” ( Franke, 2017 , p.130). Realising the importance
f these IT assets to organisations, since early the 20 0 0s cyber-
riminals have increasingly explored different cyber-tactics to at-
ack businesses ( Wall, 2015 ). In recent years, offenders have sought
o extort money via crypto-ransomware attacks. This form of mal-
are scrambles valuable data with virtually-unbreakable encryp-
ion and does not release (decrypt) it until a ransom is paid. This is
 significant shift from early variants of ransomware such as scare-
are and lockers and it has increased the impact of ransomware
nd the overall seriousness of the threat. 
This article empirically explores how organisations and investi-
ators have responded to the shift in the ransomware landscaperom scareware and locker attacks to the almost exclusive use 
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167-4048/Crown Copyright © 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access artif crypto-ransomware. In it, we draw upon empirical research to
utline how, for various reasons, victims and investigators strug-
le to respond to this form of threat effectively. In Section 2 we
escribe changes in the ransomware landscape and explore the
trengths and weaknesses of the literature to identify the key re-
earch objectives. Section 3 outlines the methodology to undertake
he research and in Section 4 , we present and discuss our findings.
ection 5 concludes. 
. Background 
.1. The rise of crypto-ransomware 
As indicated earlier, the ransomware landscape is changing dra-
atically. In 2018, Sophos found that half (54%) of the organisa-
ions they surveyed had been a victim of ransomware in the pre-
ious year with an average two attacks each. The healthcare sec-
or was hit most, followed by energy, professional services, and
he retail sector. India had the highest level of infection, followed
y Mexico, U.S., and Canada. Three quarters (77%) of organisations
ere running out-of-date endpoint security at the time of the at-
ack and half (54%) did not have specific anti-ransomware protec-
ion in place ( Sophos, 2018 ). cle under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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W  Not surprisingly, when organisations are hit by crypto-
ransomware, the costs of recovery are considerable. For example,
Sophos found in their 2018 survey that the median cost of an at-
tack was $133,0 0 0, with most organisations experiencing losses
of between $13,0 0 0 and $70,0 0 0 – a lot of money for a small
enterprise which often omits hidden costs such as loss of repu-
tation. These costs are overshadowed by the larger ransomware
worm attacks, such as NotPetya, where international shipping
firm Maersk is estimated to have lost up to $300 million dollars
( Mathews, 2017 ). The overall cost of ransomware damages for 2017
was estimated to be $5 billion and it is predicted to reach $11.5 bil-
lion in 2019 ( Morgan, 2018 ). 
In addition to significant financial losses, the risk of ran-
somware victimisation has increased by 97% since 2017
( Dobran, 2019 ) and the trend is continuing. Morgan (2018) esti-
mated that by the end of 2019 ransomware will attack a business
every 14 s decreasing to 11 s in 2021. This is compared to 40 s in
2016 as reported by Kaspersky ( Ivanov et al., 2016 ). The picture
becomes even more gloomy when new forms of attack enablers
are considered such as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) which
opens the ‘gates’ to offenders without technical experience. 
As the ransomware threat grows, then so does the list of
offenders and the increased sophistication of their victimisation
techniques. Ransomware actors (especially the enabling brokers
who provide RaaS) increasingly employ advanced delivery tech-
niques, including powerful botnets capable of sending millions of
malicious messages per day and also Internet scanners that iden-
tify vulnerable Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Furthermore, the
use of anonymised platforms on the Dark Web, spoofed email ad-
dresses and cryptocurrencies for payments makes it easier for of-
fenders to conceal their digital footprints ( Taylor et al., 2019 ). 
All of these developments in the ransomware landscape make
it much harder for law enforcement agencies to investigate ran-
somware crimes and is not helped by the offender’s use of strong
encryption which makes it hard for victims to resist the attackers
demands. If victims do not have backups in a secure location and
the lost information is mission- or safety-critical, the incentive to
pay the ransom is high, which strengthens the ransomware busi-
ness model. Even supposed decryption services have been found
to pay the ransom to release the data rather than spend time de-
crypting it ( Dudley and Kao, 2019 ). 
2.2. Related work 
The subject of ransomware has received much attention from
academics, practitioners and government bodies ( Broadhead, 2018 ).
The FBI (2018) , the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
(2018) and Europol (2016) issued documents providing guide-
lines on how to protect organisations from ransomware. The
FBI (2018) warned that prevention is the most effective defence
against ransomware, and it is critical to take precautions for
protection. Security vendors are responding by offering sophis-
ticated technical solutions against ransomware. Since 2016, due
to its prevalence, Cyber Threats Reports by the European Union
Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) included
ransomware as a separate threat from malware, offering relevant
information and statistics ( ENISA, 2018 ). 
Our search of the scholarly literature revealed that research
on ransomware has particularly mushroomed since 2016. We re-
viewed over 100 academic papers in ScienceDirect, IEEEXplore,
ACM Digital, and Google Scholar databases. Technical analysis of
ransomware ( Subedi et al., 2018; Zimba et al., 2017 ) has im-
proved our understanding of how this threat operates, subse-
quently leading to promising remedies. Ransomware countermea-
sures research emphasised the importance of security education
( Simmonds, 2017 ), policies ( Richardson and North, 2017 ), and tech-
nical controls such as detection ( Jung and Won, 2018 ), securely-onfigured software and hardware ( Saxena and Soni, 2018 ), anti-
irus (AV) software ( Pathak and Nanded, 2016 ), email hygiene
 Jakobsson, 2017 ), and Intrusion Prevention System ( Adamov and
arlsson, 2017 ). Organisations are advised to upgrade old systems
 Mansfield-Devine, 2018 ), execute regular patching ( Gagneja, 2017 ),
pply the “least privileges” approach ( Parkinson, 2017 ), segregate
he network perimeter ( Fimin, 2017 ), and implement effective
ackup practices ( Gonzalez and Hayajneh, 2017 ). Additionally, sev-
ral recovery solutions have been proposed to restore ( Baek et al.,
018 ) or decrypt ( Kolodenker et al., 2017 ) files that were scrambled
uring the attack. 
Although the abundance of research in ransomware demon-
trates that academic and practitioner communities are acutely
ware of the problem and are keen to find suitable solutions,
ost of the literature on ransomware focuses entirely on techni-
al solutions, with the exception of just a few (for example, Fimin,
017; Gagneja, 2017; Richardson and North, 2017 ). Limitations of
olely focusing on technical solutions in the context of cyber inci-
ents has been already acknowledged in the academic literature
 Connolly et al., 2017a ). As Franke (2017 , p.131) put it, “security
reaches cannot be prevented by technical means alone”. Besides,
ontemporary research acknowledges the importance of an inter-
isciplinary approach to combatting cyber threats ( Choo, 2014 ).
oreover, despite recent technical advancements (for example,
V software that contains dedicated ransomware protection algo-
ithms in place, advanced email filters etc.), ransomware attacks
ontinue to hurt organisations around the globe. 
Ransomware is not simply a technical problem, but an inter-
isciplinary one ( Sittig and Singh, 2016 ). Offenders increasingly
se social engineering techniques to penetrate organisational net-
orks as the first point of entry. The element of extortion includes
any psychological tricks in order to force victims to pay, includ-
ng count-down clocks, explicit warnings of consequences of los-
ng data, an offer to provide security advice in order to avoid sub-
equent attacks, or a strict deadline to pay with very little time
o think (in some cases only 24 h is given to victims to make
he decision). Professional offenders employ business models to as-
ess the optimal ransom amount. Ransomware incidents represent
 complex ecosystem and adversary actors exploit a combination
f weaknesses comprising of the ‘human factor’ element, technical
hortcomings, the lack of expertise in the security domain, poor
eadership and insufficient funding in organisations. Therefore, the
bjective of this study is to understand the dynamics of crypto-
ansomware attacks and inform solutions that will help organisa-
ions respond to these incidents. We approach the issue of ran-
omware holistically and take a more inclusive stance in under-
tanding and defeating this threat. 
To the best of our knowledge, no similar research with such
 specific focus on crypto-ransomware has yet been conducted.
rypto- is the focus of this paper as it is currently the most preva-
ent type of ransomware when compared to lockers and scare-
are, and it inflicts most damage due to its frequent irreversibil-
ty. Moreover, empirical investigations of ransomware attacks are
arely reported. Our own literature searches discovered only one
aper by Shinde et al. (2016) , in which the authors based their
ndings on a small-sample survey and two interviews. By collect-
ng data directly from victims, practitioners and police, we devel-
ped a comprehensive set of practical recommendations which are
llustrated later. 
. Research method 
We adopted a qualitative research approach using an inductive
ontent analysis method as a suitable methodology to reach this
tudy’s goal. Qualitative inquiries aim to gain a deep understand-
ng of a phenomenon under study ( Maykut and Morehouse, 1994 ).
e conducted a series of qualitative semi-structured interviews
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ond held a focus group through which we probed and explored
n order to generate rich data and obtain a deep understanding
f crypto-ransomware from an interdisciplinary perspective. Our
ample comprised of individuals who had first-hand experience
ith crypto-ransomware attacks as victims or investigators, the
atter included Police Officers from UK’s various cybercrime units
CCU). We also drew upon secondary data in the form of inter-
iew follow-up emails and confidential Incident Reports shared by
ictims. These secondary data sources were found to be useful
hroughout the data analysis for post-interview clarifications and
erifying results. In our data collection quest, we were interested
n how organisations became infected and how they subsequently
ecovered. We focused on their self-reflections prior to and dur-
ng the attacks and also any practices that helped them mitigate
ttacks and recover quickly. Finally, we drew out any lessons that
ictims learned as a result of the attacks and looked at the post-
ttack organisational changes that they implemented. We used the
ata to develop an all-inclusive taxonomy of crypto-ransomware
ountermeasures consisting of a) socio-technical measures b) ac-
ions for front-line managers and c) senior management. This tax-
nomy will be useful as the basis for a guide for practitioners
hich will enable an effective response to crypto-ransomware at-
acks. 
.1. Sampling strategy 
Twenty-six purposefully selected ransomware incidents were
xplored in depth. The attacks took place between 2014 and 2018.
hey comprised of diverse crypto-ransomware examples, including
ecently-emerged variants such as Cerber, Samas, BitPaymer, Wan-
aCry, Dharma, and HiddenTear and older samples such as Cryp-
oWall, CryptoLocker, TeslaCrypt, and KeyHolder. Seeking to find a
alance between targeting humans and machines as an initial vic-
imisation point, we included a variety of attack vectors such as
alicious emails, brute-force, and drive-by-downloads. Our sam-
le was comprised of organisations of various sizes, industries,
nd from both public and private sectors. The impact of the ran-
omware attacks ranged from mild disruptions with a relatively
uick recovery to severe outcomes that affected the operation of
he businesses for months. 
Details of the attacks and the victim organisations who par-
icipated in this research are outlined in Table 1 . It indicates the
ictim’s industry, organisation size and sector, and attack vector
nd target (human or machine). To respect the respondents’ confi-
entiality, aliases are used and ransom amounts concealed as they
ould otherwise be used to identify some of the informants. Also,
he names of the ransomware variants and the time of the inci-
ents were intentionally not linked to organisations’ aliases to fur-
her preserve the respondents’ anonymity. These extra precautions
elped us gain trust of the interviewees and collect some very sen-
itive data. 
.2. Data collection 
The data was collected between January and December 2018
nd sample interview questions are illustrated in Appendix 1 . The
ajority of interviews were conducted face-to-face, but a few in-
erviews with overseas respondents were conducted by Skype and
ne was done via email correspondence. Whilst selecting respon-
ents, we sought professionals who had direct experience of deal-
ng with the ransomware incidents. A total of 22 respondents di-
ectly participated in the research (5 in the focus group and 17
n interviews). The interviewees included ten IT/Security Managers
nd Executive Managers with an average of 17 years of professional
xperience, as well as six Police Officers with an average of 19ears of experience in the field. Additionally, a Security Researcher
rom a cyber security company with 15 years of experience was
nterviewed. Finally, a focus group was conducted with four Detec-
ive Constables working in the field and a Civilian Cybercrime In-
estigator who together had an average of seven years in the field.
he average duration of interviews was about one hour and ten
inutes, resulting in 386 pages of transcribed text in addition to
19 pages of documentation. 
In any qualitative research, resource constraints often dictate
hen data collection ends, however, a point of sufficient “theoreti-
al saturation” is normally reached after about a dozen or so obser-
ations ( Miles and Huberman, 1994 , pp. 30–31; Eisenhardt, 1989 ).
n this study, we felt that we reached the point of diminish-
ng returns after about twenty cases and in total we examined
wenty-six crypto-ransomware incidents even though the incre-
ental learning had already reached a plateau. 
.3. Data analysis procedure 
The data analysis consisted of five phases ( Fig. 1 ). Phase 1 ( open
oding ) began with reading through transcribed text to “obtain the
ense of the whole in order to learn what is going on, before it
an be broken down into smaller meaning units” ( Bengtsson, 2016 ,
.11). Each identified unit was first condensed and then labelled
ith the code ( Appendix 2 ). The process of open coding refers
o a non-hierarchical participant-driven deconstruction of data and
esulted in 112 distinctive codes ( Appendix 3 ), including positive
1.1.1.1–2.5.5.2) and negative (3.1.1.1–4.5.3.1) codes. Positive codes
epresent experiences that helped organisations respond to attacks,
hile negative codes refer to factors that initiated the infection, fa-
ilitated its further spread, and hindered the recovery. Changes im-
lemented after attacks have been also reflected in positive codes. 
In Phase 2, the process of categorisation took place (see Fig. 2 for
reater detail). Categories were identified and units of texts from
hase 1 were sorted into categories. Data units that fitted with
he identified categories validated that category. Furthermore, data
nits that failed to fit with existing categories generated leads to
he formation of additional categories. Over the course of this an-
lytical process the categories underwent various changes: while
ome of them were substantiated quickly, others were eliminated
s irrelevant to the focus of inquiry; some were merged due to
verlap or needed to be re-defined, and new categories emerged.
ue to the large volume of qualitative data, further sorting was
equired, and categories were grouped into themes in Phase 3 (see
ig. 2 ). Bengtsson (2016, p.12) stressed that “identified themes and
ategories should be internally homogenous and externally het-
rogeneous, which means that no data should fall between two
roups nor fit into more than one group”; we certainly met this
ondition. The themes from Phase 3 were further sorted into four
verarching themes in Phase 4 (see Fig. 2 ). 
In the final phase (Phase 5), negative codes were converted into
ositive, leading to the formation of taxonomy that consists of re-
ponse tools (controls and measures necessary to implement in or-
anisations in order to respond to crypto-ransomware effectively)
nd enablers of change (a group of employees who must ensure
he organisation is prepared for cyber-attacks) (see Fig. 3 ). To en-
ure the validity of data analysis, and maintain the quality and
rustworthiness of the procedure, each phase was peformed sev-
ral times. Appendix 2 transparently represents the process from
aw data to results required to ensure the quality of analysis. The
se of secondary data was a further check on the validity of the
ata analysis; secondary data was also used througout all phases of
ata analysis (together with primary data) as an important source
f post-interview clarifications. 
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Table 1 
A profile of respondents, organisation type and attack details. 
Organisation alias Industry; size; sector Attack vector(s) Attacker target 
LawEnfJ Law enforcement; small; public Email Human 
GovSecJN Government; large; public Email Human 
GovSecJ Government; large; public Multiple attacks: Multiple attacks: 
1.Drive-by-download 1.Machine 
2.Email 2.Human 
3.Drive-by-download 3.Machine 
4.Drive-by-download 4.Machine 
EducInstF Education; large; public Drive-by-download Machine 
EducInstFB Education; large; public Brute-force Machine 
LawEnfM Law enforcement; small Multiple attacks: Multiple attacks: 
1.Email 1.Human 
2.Email 2.Human 
GovSecA Government; large; public Brute force Machine 
LawEnfJU Law enforcement; medium; public Malicious email Human 
HealthSerJU Health service; large; public Multiple attacks: Multiple attacks: 
1.Brute-force 1.Machine 
2.Malicious email 2.Human 
LawEnfF Law enforcement; medium; public Malicious email Human 
ITOrgA IT; small; private Brute force Machine 
ConstrSupA Construction; small; private Brute force Machine 
EducOrgA Education; small; public Brute force Machine 
SecOrgM IT; small; private Email Human 
ITOrgJL IT; small; private Brute force Machine 
CloudProvJL IT; small; private Brute force Machine 
InfOrgJL Infrastructure; medium; private Brute force Machine 
ConstrSupJ Construction; small; private Brute force Machine 
RelOrgJ Religion; medium; private Email Human 
SportClubJ Sport; large; private Brute force Machine 
UtilOrgD Utilities; large; private Brute force Machine 
Fig. 1. The phases of data analysis. 
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o  3.4. Reliability and validity of findings 
Several measures were taken to verify the study results and en-
sure the reliablity of the findings. First, the employment of the
purposeful sampling technique prevented sampling distortion. Sec-
ond, the sample size was determined by the principle of theoreti-
cal saturation. Third, secondary data served as an important valida-
tor of findings. Fourth, we also asked respondents to provide feed-
back on interview transcripts and study findings and subsequently
made appropriate corrections. Fifth, the results were shared with
an experienced researcher from TrendMicro, who provided impor-
tant expert comments. Sixth, all findings are supported by intervie-
wees’ quotes, providing additional verification. Finally, the high de-
gree of unanimity among study informants about the necessary or-
ganisational measures to respond to the crypto-ransomware threat
suggests that the results are reliable and will not change signif-
icantly if additional organisations were to be interviewed. We be-
lieve these precautions have eliminated most inaccuracies and mis-
understandings from the data collection. Although we do not claim
that the list of proposed measures is exhaustive, the utilisation of
the aforementioned measures ensures reasonably reliable results. 
As for the validity of findings, the situation is generally more
complex if the chosen method is interview because the inter-
view process inevitably allows participants to answer questions
in ways that distort the facts. However, in this study, the situa-ion appears to be unique, that is participants had various incen-
ives to provide factual answers. Although we do not claim that
he study participants were entirely honest or forthcoming, sev-
ral factors allow us to conclude that interviewees provided trust-
orthy replies. First, the majority of victims suffered greatly from
rypto-ransomware attacks, including personal emotional distress
s well as physical damage to the IT infrastructure. The key in-
entive for participation in this study was to share their experi-
nces with the aim to prevent future attacks on other organisa-
ions. Interviewees appeared to be genuinely concerned with the
hreat that crypto-ransomware presents, including its recent pro-
iferation and the consequences it may entail, and several respon-
ents strongly disapproved the fact that many organisations are
iding cyber-attacks. Second, several interviewees were appalled
y the fact that criminals held them hostages and wanted to ‘share
heir story’ and warn other organisations. Third, almost all vic-
ims actively participated in validation exercises and expressed a
een interest in receiving final findings. As for Police Officers from
he CCUs, the very nature of their job is to reduce cybercrime.
ence, they have a genuine interest in providing objective data.
ur observation was that law enforcement representatives readily
hared data on ransomware attacks, carefully concealing victims’
dentities. Other tactics that may have ensured honesty in infor-
ants included clearly-communicated anonymity procedures, an
ption to change or delete parts of text in the transcripts and in
L. Y. Connolly and D.S. Wall / Computers & Security 87 (2019) 101568 5 
Fig. 2. Data analysis results (Expanding phases 2–4). 
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c  his paper, and even to withdraw from the study at any point of
ime. 
. Study findings and discussion 
The taxonomy’s components ( response tools and enablers of
hange such as front-line managers and senior management; see
ig. 3 ) were derived from an analysis of the data from semi-
tructured interviews which sought to obtain respondents’ reflec-
ions upon their personal experience of responding to crypto-
ansomware attacks. These next two Sections (4.1 and 4.2 ) outline
he views of the respondents which led to the taxonomy. 
.1. Response tools 
The interviewees felt that an all-round comprehensive approach
owards security is absolutely vital in order to protect organisa-
ions against ransomware attacks. More specifically, they strongly
mphasised the importance of user security education, technical
easures, network security, security policies and secure practices , and
he incident response strategy as essential response tools to pro-
ect organisations against crypto-ransomware (see Fig. 3 ). As the
T/Security Manager, GovSecJN put it: “The importance of a comprehensive approach to security can-
not be underestimated. That is, not only relying on controls
which prevent these sorts of attacks form happening in the first
place, but also how you then react when you are hit. Not if you
are hit, when you are hit. Because everybody will be hit if you
connect to the Internet”. 
Preparation is therefore essential, but as EducInstFB and Gov-
ecJN warned, even with all the appropriate measures imple-
ented, an organisation can still easily become a victim. Never-
heless, a well-prepared organisation will be able to respond effec-
ively: 
“When the ransomware hit, we were not panicking. We practice
good basic security principles, so we were confident. We knew
that we had solid backups. We had them in multiple locations
and those files that were affected were going to be easy to re-
cover.” (IT/Security Manager, LawEnfJ) 
GovSecA, in contrast, had no proper security measures in place.
arts of their system were out-of-date, the network management
as poor, there was no security education and they lacked an
ncident response strategy. The organisation also suffered from a
hronic lack of funding and poor leadership. Subsequently, the ran-
6 L. Y. Connolly and D.S. Wall / Computers & Security 87 (2019) 101568 
Fig. 3. A taxonomy of crypto-ransomware countermeasures. 
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(  somware attack had a severe impact, making it unable to deliver
critical services to customers for many months as well as a sig-
nificant loss of sensitive data. At the time of the interview, Gov-
SecA had already been in a post-attack recovery process for eight
months and the interviewee stressed that the recovery was still
not completed. 
Although our literature search revealed a bias towards techni-
cal advancements, our findings suggest that a comprehensive ap-
proach to security is essential to counter crypto-ransomware. This
is in line with research that focuses on cyber security in gen-ral. For example, Kraemer et al. (2009) argued that a compre-
ensive approach is necessary to strengthen cyber security in or-
anisations. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) stressed that although technical
ontrols help improve security in organisations, relying on them
xclusively is seldom enough to combat cyber threats. While or-
anisations invest more in technology-based solutions, the over-
ll number of security incidents is on the rise ( Thales, 2018 ). In-
eed, technical controls are important but nevertheless comprise
nly a portion of the all-inclusive approach developed in this study
 Fig. 3 ). The bottom line is that there is no single universal solution
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xist; rather, a suite of measures is required which takes on board
he taxonomy ( Fig. 3 ). 
.1.1. User security education 
The interviewees stressed that successful defence starts with
ser security education, self-defined as continuous, face-to-face , and
elevant because “an organisation is as vulnerable as its least savvy
ser” (Executive Manager, EducInstFB). Education that gradually
ntroduces users to security concepts, takes in consideration senior
embers of staff, attracts users to read relevant documents , and in-
ludes annual exercises, examples to demonstrate consequences, fre-
uent reminders and bulletins/briefings ( Fig. 3 ). 
In the observed sample, eleven infections out of the twenty-
ix were initiated by the user. An employee from LawEnfJU, for
xample, shut down the machine after receiving a ransom note
nd logged onto several others (one-by-one) hoping to solve the
roblem, but instead infected many more nodes on the network.
elOrgJ said that their infection was initiated by a senior indi-
idual who had little security education and was not as com-
etent with computers as younger colleagues. An employee from
awEnfM failed to recognise the obvious signs and opened a mali-
ious email; the Executive Police Officer subsequently realised that
heir online training was ineffective and replaced it with face-to-
ace education focusing upon social engineering. Following this in-
ident, employees at LawEnfM regularly receive ‘call and verify’
arnings to contact IT before opening any suspicious content. Sev-
ral interviewees emphasised the importance of using examples
f cyber incidents during training, clearly demonstrating conse-
uences for organisations and employees. IT and security personnel
rom LawEnfM, LawEnfJ, and GovSecJN issue periodical bulletins
s a measure to increase employees’ awareness regarding new
hreats. 
The IT/Security Manager from GovSecJ made the important
oint that security education is a continuous and also a gradual
ourney; it should begin during an induction process with an initial
ntroduction to security concepts and continue throughout employ-
ent to maintain security knowledge. By making education pro-
rammes relevant and emphasising that certain threats may have
nock-on effects on employees’ family members, will have positive
nfluence on their attitudes towards security and lead to security-
autious behaviour at work. Additionally, the IT/Security Manager
rom GovSecJ recommended annual practical exercises for staff at
ll levels. 
The IT/Security Manager from GovSecJN stressed that one of the
ost challenging aspects of continuous security education is at-
racting the user to read security-related documents: 
“You have got to attract people to read the document because
they are all very busy. You cannot just say, ‘Beware of malware’.
Because people get bored and they will not read it. We began
sending lots of briefings out which had song names in the title.
And it became a thing… so people would look out for it. And
go, ‘Oh I know what that song is.’ Sounds silly, but it worked.”
The value of security education is manifold in the academic lit-
rature, for example, Connolly et al. (2017b) found that security
ducation increases employee security awareness and as a conse-
uence, security-aware employees are more likely to follow formal
ontrols. Hovav and D’Arcy (2012) and Bulgurcu et al. (2010) found
hat security education can reduce the level of information systems
isuse. Barlow et al. (2013) observed that managing employee se-
urity behaviour through a variety of training methods is impor-
ant. Variety is important because the purpose of security educa-
ion is to explain to employees how to protect vital organisational
ssets and why certain rules must be in place ( Connolly et al.,
018 ). The ‘why’ is particularly vital because if employees do notnderstand the significance of a certain rule, they may not be able
o justify the extra effort they need to make to follow it through
nd will violate security requirements. Security education must
lso be repeated if there are any changes in rules and policies in
rder to ensure that employees keep abreast with organisational
equirements ( Connolly et al., 2018 ). 
.1.2. Technical measures 
Despite ongoing security awareness and education programmes,
ovSecJN and HealthSerJU reported that employees often did not
ecognise malicious emails sent to their inboxes and subsequently
nfected the network. In one particular instance, an employee was
oubtful about opening an email but in the end decided it was
egitimate, only to open a malicious attachment. Several intervie-
ees explained that human error needs to be considered but tech-
ical controls are required to support users: “no matter what any
rganisation does, with all the training in the world, if you send
nough emails to an organisation with an exciting looking attach-
ent for someone to click on, someone will click on it” (Detective
ergeant, CyberBL). Moreover, “if you rely solely on user behaviour,
ou are going to get infected… It is about having technical controls
n place to support the user. And giving staff tools to spot mali-
ious emails” (IT/Security Manager, GovSecJN). A number of techni-
al measures were also suggested by respondents, including email
ygiene, backup and recovery procedures, centrally-controlled vulner-
bility management and upgrades, detection and monitoring , and web
rotection ( Fig. 3 ). 
.1.2.1. Email hygiene. The IT/Security Manager from HealthSerJU
eported improvements related to email hygiene, following mea-
ures introduced after a user opened a malicious email and in-
ected the network. The measures blocked certain links and at-
achments and put identifiers in the header of emails coming
rom external sources. Similarly, LawEnfJ started using a malicious
ode analysis platform to check suspicious emails. The respondents
greed that although email hygiene will not stop every single ma-
icious email, it will filter out the majority of them. Mohurle and
atil (2017) noted that email is the most common source of ran-
omware infections, therefore filters must be implemented to avoid
alicious emails reaching users’ inboxes. Prakash et al. (2017) ad-
ised the manual scanning of emails containing links and attach-
ents, even if they seem to come from an authentic user. Referring
o Locky attacks, Prakash et al. (2017) stressed that offenders can
asily spoof an email address to mislead users as to the source.
ut modern workplaces demonstrate challenging conditions that
nvolve pressing deadlines, therefore, employees may not have the
ime to query an email that looks legitimate and will often just
lick on a link or an attachment. Organisations should therefore as-
ume that every malicious email that makes its way to employee
nbox will be opened and plan the implementation of appropriate
easures. Hence, relying solely on email hygiene is not effective
o protect organisations against crypto-ransomware and additional
echnological measures are required. 
.1.2.2. Vulnerability management. The respondents also reported
hat crypto-ransomware managed to take advantage of various
oftware vulnerabilities. Consequently, GovSecA and LawEnfJU im-
lemented a centrally-controlled patching regime of all network
evices, including software and hardware updates. LawEnfJU ad-
inistered mandatory updates within 24 h of release and recom-
ended – within 30 days. EducInstF made a decision to remove
lash from users’ machines. The NCSC (2016) recommends that or-
anisations perform an automated vulnerability assessment of the
ntire IT estate on a monthly basis. Patches should be applied ac-
ording to the level of severity of vulnerabilities. Choo (2011) , how-
ver, stressed that many commercial off-the-shelf products form
8 L. Y. Connolly and D.S. Wall / Computers & Security 87 (2019) 101568 
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p  the backbone of many existing systems, but also contain multiple
security vulnerabilities. Jwalapuram (2018) argued that although
considerable efforts could be made to develop ‘bug-free’ software,
in practice it is not easily achievable. Subsequently, it is reason-
able to expect that organisation cannot possibly patch every single
vulnerability and need to invest substantial resources (for exam-
ple, time and money) into appropriate vulnerability management.
Attackers, on the other hand, have to find only one vulnerability to
initiate a successful attack. 
4.1.2.3. Upgrade management. Upgrade management was high-
lighted by GovSecA and SportClubJ – these organisations had
implemented a system to centrally manage upgrades after ran-
somware penetrated networks via old machines. The watershed
WannaCry attack demonstrated the critical importance of upgrad-
ing systems so, upgrades must be assessed and managed centrally
and on a regular basis. The NCSC (2016) , however, warned about
real world limitations that prevent regular upgrades. In particular,
upgrading is costly and may disrupt business operations. Moreover,
certain systems may work differently after upgrades, presenting
risks to business operations and some specialist applications may
not be able to operate on upgraded systems at all. An Executive
Manager disclosed that some legacy systems at HealthSerJU can-
not be upgraded and therefore require extra protection if ever con-
nected to the Internet. IT specialists advise keeping legacy systems
on heavily-protected sub-networks or, if possible, permanently of-
fline. 
4.1.2.4. Advanced monitoring and detection. Our respondents indi-
cated that several ransomware incidents occurred due to insuf-
ficient or lack of monitoring and detection controls, including
AV software and firewalls. Learning from mistakes, HealthSerJU
implemented AV systems with an advanced level of protection,
LawEnfJ switched to a cloud-based model where security updates
are centrally-managed and EducInstF upgraded an AV solution
from signature-based to behaviour-based. HealthSerJU and LawEnfJ
also installed advanced monitoring and detection software, which
proactively feeds information about any new threats and alerts
businesses, allowing them to take action before attack campaigns.
Moreover, HealthSerJU replaced its old firewalls with advanced ver-
sions that provide a higher level of protection and GovSecJN in-
stalled software that can recognise and block malicious IPs when
ransomware tries to connect back to the control server. 
AV software is primarily designed to prevent, detect and re-
move malware. At best it must offer an advanced level of protec-
tion beyond signature-based in order to detect unknown threats.
However, not all AV software are the same. Nevertheless, Al-
rimy et al. (2018) found that even advanced detection methods
have flaws and ransomware may still remain on the network un-
detected. Sukwong et al. (2011) stressed that users must take
precautions before downloading or opening any unknown files.
Kaspersky (2018) noted the advantages of cloud-based AV, includ-
ing automatic updates and a reduced amount of processing power
required to keep the system safe, compared to the locally managed
AV. Several leading security vendors have developed AV solutions
with dedicated ransomware protection in place, though their effec-
tiveness is unknown. 
Firewalls are used to filter incoming traffic and can be config-
ured to allow or block packets from specific IP addresses and ports.
Sophos (2017) stressed that modern firewalls can effectively defend
against ransomware attacks, for example, a sophisticated firewall
may include an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that prevents at-
tacks like WannaCry and NotPetya by performing a deep packet
inspection and blocking network exploits such as EternalBlue. The
IDS can also recognise connections with malicious IPs and causeouters to terminate them. To support a user at the network en-
ry, a firewall may include a sandboxing technology that identi-
es suspicious files at the gateway and sends them to a safe loca-
ion for behavioural analysis. However, Saådaoui et al. (2014) cau-
ioned that the effectiveness of firewalls mainly depends on the
uality of configuration and hence a formal approach to manage
rewalls is required. Generally, maintaining firewalls necessitates
pecialised knowledge. Furthermore, Moore (2010) warned that a
rewall is not an ultimate solution to security threats; it is simply
ne of many tools in a broader cyber security toolkit. Although re-
earch on detection is ongoing and assuring; organisations should
ot solely rely on detection technologies to protect against crypto-
ansomware. 
.1.2.5. Backups and recovery. Our respondents stressed that ef-
ective backup practices are essential to save organisations from
 lengthy recovery and even bankruptcy. These include regular
ackup procedures, maintenance of backups in online and of-
ine locations, frequent testing, and processes that ensure a struc-
ured recovery, for example, according to the level of criticality
f data and applications. EducInstFB, LawEnfM, LawEnfF, ITOrgA,
nd ITOrgJL all paid the ransom demand because of their inef-
ective backup procedures and critical data/applications being en-
rypted. In contrast, LawEnfJ, GovSecJN, GovSecJ, EducInstF, Health-
erJU, CloudProvJL, InfOrgJL, RelOrgJ successfully recovered from
rypto-ransomware because they had backups: “What helped us
as that we backed up our data up. That ultimately saved our
kin.” (IT/Security Manager from GovSecJN). 
Reflecting on past experiences, the interviewees shared their
nowledge relevant to effective backup procedures. For example,
he Executive Police Officer from LawEnfM brought attention to
aulty backups, where only parts of files were backed up. This was
 devastating discovery during the attack, which forced the victim
o pay the ransom. Following the incident, the organisation im-
lemented frequent backup testing procedures. Most of GovSecA’s
ackups were retained locally and these became encrypted dur-
ng the attack. The organisation since moved to a backup solution
hat includes both online and offline locations. ConstrSupJ admit-
ed firing their external IT provider for failing to maintain effective
ackups, however, an Executive Manager from EducInstFB warned:
Backups are not like fairy dust… You do not just plug in a backup
nd suddenly everything is up and running and you are doing well.
ecovering from backups is a lengthy process.” But, backing up
ata is a complex process that also requires preparation. 
The importance of backups has been stressed in the academic
iterature ( Kumar and Kumar, 2013 ) as they represent the only real
ine of technical defence against crypto-ransomware (after the in-
ection takes place). Backups must be recent, regularly tested, and
ept in locations inaccessible to ransomware ( Al-rimy et al., 2018 ).
aintaining backups is more challenging in larger networks and
dopting a clear recovery strategy is a must. 
.1.2.6. Web protection. Respondents recommended additional
easures such as web filters and protection of public-facing
ebsites. Web content filter tools aim to prevent employees from
ccessing web pages that may potentially contain a malicious con-
ent. Although they are effective because they restrict web access,
ven legitimate sites could become a source of infection as was
he case with GovSecJ and EducInstF, where an employee visited a
egitimate but infected website and crypto-ransomware penetrated
he network via drive-by-download. Besides, web content filtering
s not a suitable measure in research-intense organisations, where
mployees could be prevented from doing their work. Website
onfiguration and vulnerability scanning software can scan web
ontent for vulnerabilities and subsequently increase protection of
ublic-facing websites, however, as with all detection technologies,
L. Y. Connolly and D.S. Wall / Computers & Security 87 (2019) 101568 9 
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t  he problem of newly-emerged vulnerabilities and continuously
hanging threat landscape remains. 
.1.3. Network security 
Unprotected networks allow crypto-ransomware to propagate
nd infect a large number of nodes. Several victims experienced
ttacks that led to dramatic consequences due to network security
ssues, including weak network infrastructure, inappropriate access
ontrol management and inefficient maintenance of the RDP ( Fig. 3 ). 
.1.3.1. Network infrastructure. Interviewees highlighted several is-
ues which weaken network infrastructures, including poor net-
ork visibility, flat network structure, inappropriate naming con-
entions, unnecessary-large IT estates and inappropriate backup lo-
ations. The Executive Manager from EducInstFB, an organisation
hat is distributed across dozens of buildings, admitted that an
verall lack of network visibility resulted in severe consequences,
ncluding hundreds of infected devices, large volumes of sensitive
ata being encrypted and paralysed critical systems. Prior to the
ttack, an unlimited number of devices had an unrestricted per-
ission to connect to the network, making these devices invisible.
onsequently, the IT department was not able to identify all the lo-
ations of crypto-ransomware or assess the extent of the damage.
ltimately, they made the decision to pay criminals and while the
ajority of data and systems were restored, the recovery process
as challenging and lasted for months. 
A lack of network visibility is a common problem and
igamon (2017) warned that two thirds (67%) of organisations
ave network blind spots, particularly in very large networks,
here maintaining visibility is increasingly difficult. Security chal-
enges increase when there is a lack of proper network visibility.
ore specifically, unaccounted network nodes may contain many
ulnerabilities, making an organisation an easy target for cyber-
riminals. Subsequently, threat detection on so-called ‘invisible’
achines is impossible. Potentially, an attacker can penetrate net-
ork via the ‘invisible’ machine and stay undetected for prolonged
eriods of time, assessing network topology and carefully planning
ubsequent actions. Although maintaining network visibility is es-
ential, it is easier to be achieved in the smaller IT estates. Virtual-
sation is a potential solution to ‘in-house’ hardware maintenance,
owever, cloud computing presents many distributed security risks
 Ahmed and Hossain, 2014 ) which must be prudently assessed. A
roperly documented IT estate will also increase the overall net-
ork visibility, so network segmentation becomes an important
ecurity measure as a properly segmented network will make it
ore difficult for attackers to spread infection ( US-CERT, 2016 ).
ovSecA, for example, experienced a substantial attack, in which
rypto-ransomware spread to over 100 servers and infected crit-
cal systems. The IT/Security Manager acknowledged that the flat
etwork structure allowed the threat to propagate to such an ex-
ent. Although network segmentation aims to isolate sensitive data
nd systems, and can potentially save millions in cyber-attacks
 Guta, 2017 ), the architecture requires specialist knowledge and is
ostly to implement and maintain. 
Other issues related to poor network infrastructure include un-
ecessarily large IT estates and inappropriate backup locations. Af-
er they were attacked, the management at GovSecA realised that
umerous vulnerable servers were not even serving a specific pur-
ose within the organisation and removed them. Furthermore, an
mployee from RelOrgJ was able to work from a backup loca-
ion demonstrating that the system was not properly set up by
T professionals. As a result of this oversight, the machine got in-
ected and the crypto-ransomware also encrypted backups caus-
ng the IT team to restructure the network accordingly in the
ecovery. Finally, ITOrgJL experienced a semi-targeted ransomware attack
ia a vulnerable RDP (as mentioned in Section 4.1.3.3 ). Once inside
he network, the attackers manually evaluated its topology, gath-
ring very sensitive information. Due to weak naming convention
ractices, attackers swiftly identified types of servers on the net-
ork. More specifically, the organisation named their servers ac-
ording to functionality, for example the backup server was named
backup server’, the email server – ‘email server’, and so on. Al-
hough the attack occurred as a result of a combination of fac-
ors, this particular weak practice gave attackers the advantage of
ime. 
.1.3.2. Access control management. Inadequate access control man-
gement allows some variants of crypto-ransomware lateral move-
ent across infected networks causing devastating outcomes. Such
nfections have far greater impact on organisations than attacks
n individual systems. An IT/Security Contractor at GovSecA re-
orted that many employees were given administrative rights to
ystems they should not have access to, and weak password prac-
ices exposed the organisation to a particularly harmful attack, al-
owing attackers to escalate privileges on the network. During the
ecovery process, the organisation implemented several measures
o strengthen network defences. More specifically, employees’ roles
nd responsibilities were reviewed and documented, and an ad-
inistrative access was granted appropriately. Two separate ac-
ounts were set up for administrators; one under regular user se-
urity context for day-to-day work, and another for administrative
asks. Whilst this is a major inconvenience for all users involved,
t is a necessary security measure. Furthermore, operation manu-
ls were developed for each business application, clarifying roles,
esponsibilities, and, subsequently, the level of access for each em-
loyee, including senior management. 
.1.3.3. RDP maintenance. ITOrgA, ConstrSupA, EducOrgA, ITOrgJL,
loudProvJL, and ConstrSupJ were infected due to weak RDP prac-
ices. Recovery measures therefore included RDP whitelisting, dis-
bling RDP when not in use, employing alternative solutions such
s Virtual Private Network (VPN) and appropriate password proce-
ures (for example, using strong and avoiding default passwords,
hanging passwords frequently). The Detective Sergeant from Cy-
erBL explained that people do not realise that having the RDP
urned on is unwise. They tend to use RDP once or twice for a
pecific purpose then never turn it off: 
“… It is best to switch off RDP. Or even if you were to change
the port number to something just random, then it would be
much harder to identify. But if you use it on its default port
and leave it switched on, you are in trouble … and what we
have seen is that approximately 50% of organisations attacked
via RDP had password ‘password1’. In approximately 25% of the
cases, the admin password was the same as the user name. So,
if the user was called Bob, the password was Bob.”
Although RDP offers some advantages compared to VPNs, the
rawbacks must be understood. Some VPN solutions allow to use
ulti-factor authentication and multiple ports, while RDP does not
upport that. Moreover, a user can lock down credentials with a
ertificate of authentication. Therefore, even if an attacker obtained
sername and password, access to network would be denied with-
ut an appropriate security certificate. Not only is the VPN’s en-
ryption is stronger compared to RDP, VPNs do not suffer from as
any software vulnerabilities as the RDP and connections via VPNs
nable a more secure remote access. When set up correctly, VPN
llows a remote access without exposing the work computer to the
ntire Internet. RDP, on the other hand, becomes vulnerable once
he connection is established and port 3389 is opened. It is impor-
ant to note that RDP enables access to the computer, whereas VPN
10 L. Y. Connolly and D.S. Wall / Computers & Security 87 (2019) 101568 
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g  enables access to the network and creates a more secure environ-
ment ( Scott, 2017 ). 
Keeping networks secure is a challenging task and, as with
technical controls, it requires appropriate funding and highly-
skilled specialists who can carefully weigh risks against benefits
and suggest optimal solutions. 
4.1.4. Security policies and secure practices 
Many ransomware attacks happened because of weak organisa-
tional security policies and practices which made it easier for of-
fenders. An employee from LawEnfJU, for example, was aware that
something was wrong, but unsuccessfully tried to fix the problem
alone rather than immediately report the suspected malicious ac-
tivity to IT services. As a result, several additional systems became
infected and the opportunity to stop the attack was lost. Follow-
ing this incident, LawEnfJU implemented a requirement to report
suspicious activities immediately. 
LawEnfJ, GovSecA, EducInstFB, HealthSerJU and ConstrSupJ were
all attacked on a weekend. Such timing gives offenders the op-
portunity to reconnoitre network topology. Certain variants of ran-
somware can also stay dormant on the network for an unlimited
period, until devices in a ‘sleep’ mode are turned on by users. A
Detective Constable from CyberBR said that: 
“Weekend is a good time for criminals to target any company
because everybody leaves work at 4 o’clock on a Friday and do
not come back to work until Monday. Especially targeting the
server at the weekend is good, because you have not got staff
in to try and mitigate any problems.”
EducInstFB shared their experience of not shutting down de-
vices: 
“The other vulnerability that created an open door for ran-
somware is people not shutting down at the end of the day.
We all do that. Following the investigation, we did find that
this particular ransomware was taking advantage of devices
that were asleep. Once ransomware found such devices, it was
staying dormant until somebody woke up the device. This poor
practice created an open door because we had many dormant
devices. If they had been actually truly shut down, the impact
of the attack would not be as severe.”
The affected organisations subsequently enforced a rule requir-
ing employees to shut computers down at the end of each working
day. In addition, reminders to shut down computers were sent to
all staff on Fridays and prior to holiday festivities. 
LawEnfJ had several partnerships with other organisations,
which involved sharing some systems, including email applica-
tions. An employee from LawEnfJ received a malicious email into
one of the external partner’s inbox and opened it on the LawEnfJ’s
network. An investigation revealed that the partner-organisation
did not have appropriate email hygiene. Subsequently, the victim
instigated a formal agreement with all external partners on mini-
mal security measures necessary to protect LawEnfJ’s network. 
A thorough investigation at EducInstF and LawEnfJU revealed
that employees used computers for personal reasons, which effec-
tively led to infections. While EducInstF did not implement any
changes since the nature of the business would not allow to re-
strict users’ browsing habits, LawEnfJU changed the policy accord-
ingly. 
Following a ransomware infection, the IT/Security Manager
from LawEnfJU implemented practices such as checking security
logs on a daily basis and regularly scanning all installed systems.
Furthermore, EducInstFB and GovSecA enforced stricter rules in re-
lation to password practices, obliging employees to create strong
passwords, change them frequently, use different passwords at
home and work, and keep passwords safe. Several respondents shared that post-attack changes to secu-
ity policies were necessary, leading to improved secure practices.
 security policy defines rules and guidelines for the proper use
f organisational IT resources ( D’Arcy et al., 2009 ). Implementing
ecurity policies in organisations is vital for several reasons. First,
olicies outline rules but also consequences of disobeying these
ules. Therefore, policies are viewed as a form of formal sanc-
ions. Prior research demonstrates that sanctions positively influ-
nce behaviour in organisational settings ( Bulgurcu et al., 2010 ).
onnolly et al. (2018) , however, warned that the simple existence
f security policies will not have the desired effect. Policies must
e visible, up-to-date, easy to follow, properly enforced and tai-
ored to a specific organisational environment or even a depart-
ent in larger organisations. The most common way of promoting
olicies is via education and awareness programmes. 
Following their ransomware victimisation, LawEnfJ, EducInstFB,
awEnfM, LawEnfJU, ITOrgA and ITOrgJL updated their organisa-
ional security policies and practices. The measures included a
andatory reporting of suspicious activities, shutting down of devices
t the end of the day, business-only use of computers, secure pass-
ords, security logs and systems scanning , and formal agreements
ith partners ( Fig. 3 ). 
.1.5. Incident response strategy 
Our respondents indicated that the presence of an effective
ncident response strategy had a direct impact on reducing the
onsequences of ransomware attacks. The incident response ap-
roaches vary in different organisations but typically the strat-
gy represents a suite of documents. Our interviewees specifically
rought to our attention the communication plan , the incident re-
ponse plan and the business continuity plan ( Fig. 3 ). 
.1.5.1. Communication plan. GovSecJN and LawEnfJ reported that
ttention from media and security vendors had a negative impact
n the recovery process: 
“Vendors and media, trying to get a hold of us, created ‘com-
munication wild west’… They created almost their own denial-
of-service because I was trying to do work [recover from ran-
somware attack] and I was constantly getting phone calls and
emails…and people turning up. Dealing with that meant I could
not deal with the fallout of the crypto-ransomware attack.”
(IT/Security Manager, GovSecJN) 
Respondents also warned that not only does media attention
amper the recovery process, but it is important to avoid misinfor-
ation in media: 
“The media gruesomely exaggerated the ransom amount [from
three-digit figure to seven-digit figure]. And within half an hour
I had five Police Officers on the doorstep because they thought
we were subject to an ongoing live fraud or bribery. And also,
vendors…And that was really disappointing actually because we
expect security vendors to try and establish fact. And it just did
not help because what the effect was – we were overloaded
with different parties contacting us…Employees spent a lot of
the time worrying about what is going to be said in the press.”
(IT/Security Manager, GovSecJN) 
Following these experiences, the respondents made several
hanges to their communication plans; for example, the IT/Security
anager from GovSecJN designated a person to deal with external
takeholders during their ongoing cyber-attack. In large organisa-
ions, a communication team is usually formed for such purposes.
ovSecJN also considered a switchboard to filter calls. Although
ducInstF warned about being extremely cautious with wording
he messages to the outside world, LawEnfM and EducInstFB sug-
ested that it is important to be transparent with the information
L. Y. Connolly and D.S. Wall / Computers & Security 87 (2019) 101568 11 
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s  n security breaches: “And I can tell you one of the things that re-
lly bothers me about all of this – when people keep this behind
losed doors, I think that we are giving the advantage to the bad
uys” (Executive Manager, EducInstFB). 
LawEnfM added that once a security breach becomes public, it
s reasonable to expect numerous external parties to contact the
ictim. However, being reluctant to disclose will only exaggerate
he level of hype: 
“My philosophy in general is to let the media know what I can
before they come to me. The interest will die down sooner if
we share … The media was interested, so we sent out a press
release telling them what had happened in general. And, of
course, that generated some response. But I think from a tac-
tical perspective we were able to better control the information
that goes out.” (Executive Police Officer, LawEnfM) 
Another important aspect of the communication plan is in-
orming staff throughout the organisation about the attack, in-
luding regular employees and management. GovSecJ and GovSecA
id not have a clear strategy in place that takes in consideration
T resources being down, including email. GovSecJ relied on the
nternet-dependent telephone line and the communication plan
id not include mobile numbers of senior management. Subse-
uently, the communication channel with executive staff was bro-
en and some big decisions had to be made without consulting
op level management. GovSecJ and GovSecJN warned that a robust
rocedure is necessary to inform all staff across the organisations:
The cascade approach is very useful [top-down method], where
ou text top level managers first, then they text to middle level
anagers…and so on until everybody is informed.” (IT/Security
anager, GovSecJN) 
Prior to the attack, all staff at EducInstFB had emergency appli-
ation installed on their mobile phones. The application had two
hannels – one to notify employees and a separate channel to
ommunicate with senior leaders. Such proactive communication
ethod allowed to notify staff immediately. An Executive Manager
rom EducInstFB also warned about the importance of informing
mployees about crypto-ransomware attacks due to the nature of
his malware. More specifically, the majority of crypto-ransomware
ariants are able to propagate on networks and certain actions of
mployees can stimulate the spread (for example, turning on a
sleeping’ device). Besides, the Executive Manager from EducInstFB
hared that informed staff can become instrumental to a robust
ecovery. In this case, they put up posters stating in prominent
laces “Please Do Not Turn On Or Wake Up Your Computer” be-
ause “we were at risk that anybody who came in woke up their
omputer could have the potential that this thing was lying in wait
o lock you down.” (Executive Manager, EducInstFB). 
.1.5.2. Incident response plan. LawEnfJ, GovSecJN, HealthSerJU and
ducInstFB commented that the incident response plan must in-
lude a methodical response to the crypto-ransomware attack, in-
orporating clearly-documented processes and an accurate descrip-
ion of responsibilities to make vital decisions: 
“An awful lot of lessons were learnt following the attack. We
have completely redesigned our major incident response plan
as part of this. There is nothing like a live incident to test your
processes and most of our processes worked well but a lot of
them were undocumented. There is a lot more formalisation of
our major incident action plan now. There is a lot more pro-
cesses and policies which back all of that up.” (IT/Security Man-
ager, HealthSerJU) 
An IT/Security Manager from GovSecJ also advised to document
ll decisions made during the attack. Sometimes difficult decisions
ust be made instantly and later on accounted for. For example,ollowing the attack, GovSecJ disabled the Internet access across
he whole organisation in order to prevent infection spread. Es-
entially, this decision had a negative effect on every user because
ajor communication channels like email and telephony were cut
ff. Documenting these decisions and the reasons why they were
ade is vital as senior management will seek an explanation as to
hy such drastic measures were taken. 
Furthermore, the Executive Manager from EducInstFB advised to
reate a cost account during ongoing incidents: 
“At the time of the crypto-ransomware attack, we had another
ongoing major event. We set up separate cost control structures
to ensure that any related costs were going into one specific
bucket so that when it is time to get the reimbursement, you
do not have to do a major reconciliation. When time came to
file our claim with our insurer, we just picked up those iso-
lated costs. We did not have to pay a team of accountants to go
through thousands of invoices to try and separate them, so that
was very important.”
.1.5.3. Business continuity plan. The incident response strategy at
ovSecA had numerous scenarios related to different disasters (for
xample, industrial action, environmental events) but not a cyber-
ttack with the loss of IT. Such oversight led to the inability to
erve customers and hindered a recovery process, for example, one
organisation had business continuity plans in place, but the sce-
arios were regional emergency scenarios or environmental sce-
arios. They did not have a scenario in place for a cyber-attack,
hich greatly deteriorated the recovery process.” (IT/Security Con-
ractor, GovSecA). The IT/Security Manager from GovSecJN stressed
hat business continuity should be coordinated with the incident
nvestigation. An effective investigation of a cyber-attack aims to
nd the source of the attack and close down all vulnerabilities to
revent further attacks. 
Ahmad et al. (2012) stressed that it is inevitable for an organi-
ation that has an Internet connection and uses information and
ommunication technologies to suffer a security breach at some
tage. Anderson et al. (2012) noted that although a lot of mea-
ures can be taken to prevent and mitigate security incidents, it
s not economically feasible to fully protect all systems. Therefore,
rganisations need to be prepared and react appropriately when
yber-attacks strike ( Tøndel et al., 2014 ). Although an incident re-
ponse strategy is a complex matter reflected in a suite of docu-
ents (for the comprehensive guidelines please refer to standards
utlined by ISO/IEC 27035), we specifically focused in this paper
n the communication, incident response and business continuity
lans (as advised by respondents). 
.2. Enablers of change 
The enablers of change ( front-line and senior management ) rep-
esent a group of employees who must ensure the organisation is
repared for cyber-attacks ( Fig. 3 ). The front-line managers (inter-
hangeably referred to as middle or mid-level managers) have a re-
ponsibility to implement and maintain appropriate security mea-
ures in organisations. In order to achieve this goal, they are re-
uired to convince senior management that IT and security are the
op priority for the organisation in order to obtain funding. On the
ther hand, the function of senior management is to ensure that
he organisation is ready to respond methodically to cyber-attacks
y overlooking IT function and making optimal decisions regarding
ecurity funding ( Fig. 3 ). 
.2.1. Front-line management 
Our respondents suggested that front-line managers must pos-
ess certain skills and abilities to be fit for the task ( Fig. 3 ). First,
12 L. Y. Connolly and D.S. Wall / Computers & Security 87 (2019) 101568 
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 management is required to be knowledgeable in the area of secu-
rity and IT in general . Second, the effective utilisation of external and
internal resources is a must skill. Third, front-line management is
responsible for harvesting certain cultural traits and attitudes in or-
ganisations in order to promote behaviours that compliment organ-
isational security priorities. Finally, organisations need to seek in-
dividuals who are not only influential and are able to invoke nec-
essary changes but also hard-working, determined and committed
to the job – the true champions ( Fig. 3 ). 
4.2.1.1. Security and IT knowledge. LawEnfJ, GovSecJN, and Gov-
SecJ demonstrated a methodical and swift response to the crypto-
ransomware attack due to front-line managers being security- and
IT-savvy. On the contrary, ransomware attacks at GovSecA and
EducInstFB took staff by surprise, leading to dire consequences, in-
cluding a lengthy recovery. The following comments confirm that
front-line managers must be knowledgeable in the area of security
in order to respond effectively to attacks. The IT/Security Manager
from LawEnfJ said that the organisation was well-prepared when
the ransomware hit: “I credit that a lot to my knowledge in secu-
rity side of things… When I got a phone call informing me that we
were under cyber-attack, immediately I had inkling about what it
could possibly be. Knowing what to expect definitely helped us re-
cover fast.” But the IT/Security Contractor from GovSecA found the
opposite in another case: 
“There were two IT staff…they had been here for twenty
years…and they left…the organisation only had desk support
staff left and they did not understand the architecture of the IT
estate… and did not have any documentation to make impor-
tant decisions. Subsequently, the attack devastated the organi-
sation and the recovery was very lengthy”. 
4.2.1.2. Optimal utilisation of resources. Victims of ransomware at-
tacks shared their experience on how they utilised various re-
sources during attacks. For example, an Executive Manager from
EducInstFB suggested purchasing cyber insurance because their cy-
ber insurer also made several useful recommendations to help
with the recovery process and reimbursed the victim some ex-
penses. The IT/Security Manager from LawEnfJU shared that they
hired an external cyber response team to help with the incident
and they were able to decrypt the scrambled data. The IT/Security
Contractor from GovSecA said that their external cyber expert was
able to stop the ransomware encryption process and the Execu-
tive Manager from EducInstFB recommended engaging a cyber re-
sponse team and a breach coach before an attack: 
“Find a breach coach [i.e. a lawyer who specifically deals
with cyber-breaches and advises clients], find a cyber response
team [i.e. to conduct a thorough investigation and find patient
zero]…get an engagement set up with them, not a retainer, so
there is no need to pay, just an engagement. We wasted time
trying to engage with specialists and that was really critical,
and I wish we had this engagement.”
Several participants suggested caution when choosing an exter-
nal IT service provider. After being attacked, ConstrSupJ realised
that the external IT team failed to maintain proper backups. Sub-
sequently, the victim suffered severe consequences, including the
loss of vital information and a lengthy recovery. The Executive Po-
lice Officer from LawEnfM had a similar issue with the internal IT
team and decided to take the matter in their own hands: 
“When we got hit by ransomware, I was embarrassed, and I was
angry… I was angry on two levels. I was upset that we had in-
vited the virus. I was upset at our IT folks because I thought wewere protected from this. We had what we thought was an ade-
quate level of security and policies in place for our staff. Unfor-
tunately, the backup software malfunctioned, and our IT folks
did not pick up on it. Since the attack, I perform regular cyber
threat risk assessments.”
The IT/Security Manager from GovSecJN praised the response
hey received from the external IT provider that happened to be
ocated nearby; the local presence of IT specialists greatly helped
he recovery process. 
.2.1.3. Cultivate culture and attitudes. IT/Security Managers from
ovSecJN and GovSecJ emphasised the importance of encouraging
pen reporting culture because a timely response to ransomware is
bsolutely essential. Without an open reporting culture, staff worry
bout being subject to disciplinary action. It “discourages people
rom picking up the phone and telling us about it. We want people
o tell us … everybody makes mistakes. So, let’s move away from
laming somebody and understand why it happened and what
e can do to try and reduce the risk of that happening again.”
IT/Security Manager GovSecJN). But the organisational culture also
as to harvest a culture of solidarity among its employees. In high-
olidarity environments employees understand and share organisa-
ional goals; they are cooperative, loyal, and express great satisfac-
ion and pride working for their organisations. On the contrary, in
ow-solidarity organisations employees believe that organisational
roblems are not their problems: “An employee received an email
nd they should not have clicked on it, but they did. There was a
ertain amount of apathy. The user said, ‘It does not matter, it is
ot going to affect me.’ They were not happy with their working
nvironment.” (IT/Security Manager from GovSecJ). 
GovSecJN, GovSecJ, EducInstF, EducInstFB, and FinOrgJL added
hat internal staff solidarity is also the key to an effective recovery.
ollowing attacks, people are forced to work in challenging condi-
ions, including longer hours, the absence of main communication
hannels and computing devices. Culture of solidarity is an impor-
ant drive in these challenging circumstances. EducInstFB said that
espite a very long recovery process and disabled communication
hannels, employees stayed supportive and helpful: 
“What was very interesting and hugely important to the recov-
ery process is that we had people without email. We had peo-
ple who could not Skype. We had people who had no contacts
on their phones. And yet everyone was supportive…I still mar-
vel the fact that we had numerous ransom notes and not one
was leaked to the press and not one was tweeted out on social
media… And it is always good to do great things in the good
times, but it is pretty amazing to see people helping in the bad
times because that really does say a lot about our culture.” (Ex-
ecutive Manager, EducInstFB) 
In contrast to the above, GovSecA stressed that while many staff
ere incredibly positive and went to great lengths to support the
ecovery (for example, travelling many miles every day for months
n order to continue to deliver services), there were employees
ho complained about difficulties in working during the recov-
ry process and also fed information to the press which fuelled
tress among staff and hampered recovery. An Executive Manager
rom EducInstFB stressed that extra support is needed to encour-
ge employees’ cooperation, including open communication, grati-
ude, and necessary supplies: 
“We believe in open transparent communication and we in-
formed staff immediately…If you tell people what is going on,
then they will feel that they are being cared for, and they are
far more likely to be supportive. If you leave them in the dark,
first, they are going to make stuff up. But second, they are go-
ing to feel very agitated because nobody is helping them un-
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p  derstand what is going on…Beyond that it is bringing in food,
bringing in beverages and doing the walk around and letting
employees know that you are there supporting them and recog-
nising them for the great work that they are doing. It was im-
portant to let them know that senior management is respectful
and appreciative of what they are doing.”
GovSecA and GovSecJ suggested that it is also important to
hange the mindset and attitudes of all staff regarding IT resources.
ince the emergence of the digital economy, businesses highly rely
n technologies. Cyber-attacks cause prolonged outages, affecting
ot only IT resources but directly businesses, leading to devastat-
ng interruptions in business activities, loss of customers and sub-
equently soured revenues. In some environments, employees tend
o believe that IT staff are at fault of such disruptions. This is, how-
ver, a complex problem and the well-being of IT resources de-
ends on several factors. Multiple stakeholders have access to key
esources and therefore play an important role in protecting these
ssets. IT is not a separate entity functioning on its own, but is
art of the complex organisational ecosystem. Employees need to
nderstand the importance of IT and take responsibility for keep-
ng these resources safe, while managers at all levels must dis-
eminate this message throughout the organisation. Respondents
pined that it often takes a security breach to change attitudes: 
“Following the attack, the cyber threat is on the strategic risk
register. So, before everybody knew about malicious software. It
was something that happened to somebody else. Post the attack
everybody realised the serious impact it can have on an organ-
isation. And attitudes changed all the way through the organi-
sation from the very top to the very bottom. They understood
the danger of malware. And even now when we do presenta-
tions to internal teams, people always talk about the malware
attack we had. So, it changed attitudes which is good. And it’s
up to us to make sure that attitude continues in a positive way.”
(IT/Security Manager, GovSecJ) 
.2.1.4. The need for cyber security champions. We found that em-
loying cyber security champions who are influential and deter-
ined is vital to ensure a proper protection against security in-
idents. For example, interviewees shared that obtaining funding
or cyber security is an extremely challenging task in some organ-
sations. GovSecJ, GovSecJN and GovSecA stressed that one of the
ain barriers to effective def ences against cyber threats, includ-
ng crypto-ransomware, is the lack of support (often financial) from
xecutive management: 
“Executive managers do not listen to IT managers like me be-
cause they are focused on their job… They are not thinking
about security and protection. Security is perceived as a second
nature or ignored completely. We, front-line managers, need to
speak to CEOs and the senior leadership teams or the people
that can make those decisions.” (IT/Security Manager, GovSecJ) 
However, senior management also faces a dilemma over
hether they stop providing vital services to the community or
pend money on cyber security. IT managers have to get senior
anagement to buy into the concept of security. Moreover, senior
anagers “do not feel the lack of security is a threat because too
any cyber-attacks are still kept quiet out of the fear of incrimina-
ion (for example, fines, loss of reputation).” (IT/Security Manager,
ovSecJ). Therefore, front-line managers have a challenging task to
onvince senior management that security controls and IT in gen-
ral are vital for the organisational well-being. 
“You have got to convince those who have their hands on the
purse strings that security presents value to the organisation.
Although we have to meet our legal obligations in terms of se-curity but actually, the organisation has lots of legal obligations
it has got to meet. And when there is not enough money to go
around, some of those legal obligations will fall by the wayside.
We compete with other departments. And you have just got to
make your business case the best. And we do that by explain-
ing to them the impact of getting it wrong…the consequences
of cyber-attacks.” (IT/Security Manager, GovSecJN) 
Front-line managers are the connecting link between regular
mployees and senior management. They work closely with staff
nd directly influence the perceptions and conduct of employees. If
iddle management perceives cyber security as an important or-
anisational function, this stance inevitably becomes clear to em-
loyees and translates into appropriate behaviour. Broadbent and
itzis (2004) noted that effective managers go beyond pure man-
gement and lead by setting expectations and influencing others
o change. Van Niekerk and von Solms (2005) found that man-
gers play an important role in fostering cultural traits in organ-
sations. Cheng et al. (2013) concluded that managers should aim
o strengthen the relationships between employees and an organi-
ation through a number of actions, including offering em ployees a
ense of achievement and satisfaction; which will, in turn, increase
oyalty to the organisational rules. Posey et al. (2011) stressed that
anagers must demonstrate leadership and knowledge in all as-
ects of their work in order to influence change. Indeed, all of the
bove require enthusiastic individuals (true champions) who be-
ieve they can inspire required transformations among regular em-
loyees and senior management. 
.2.2. Senior management 
The effort s of champions, however, may still be in vain. The re-
pondents stressed that it is important for senior management to
ave IT expertise and to appreciate IT as an organisational function
 Fig. 3 ). An IT/Security Contractor shared that at the time of the
ttack IT governance at GovSecA was in a poor state. More specif-
cally, the IT Executive did not have technical background and was
ompletely unaware of how to run IT properly. This, in turn, led
o many prolonged IT problems and subsequently to an extremely
engthy recovery. 
“Generally, IT gets more and more complicated and it is wrong
that the organisations of this size [large organisation] cannot
afford a larger IT team. The IT team here is getting squeezed
and squeezed. It is not just tiny, it is absolutely tiny. So, you
cannot possibly have all of the skills you need for the in-house
to manage IT estate” (IT/Security Contractor, GovSecA). 
Furthermore, several respondents reported that senior manage-
ent is often very reluctant to provide funding due to other finan-
ial commitments. The IT/Security Manager from GovSecJ warned
hat the lack of support from senior management will inevitably
ead to the poor security posture, making organisations vulnerable
o crypto-ransomware attacks: 
“If you do not listen to the protection team, then at one point
something is going to break, leaving the organisation vulnerable
to attacks … I wrote a report following the ransomware attack,
recommending a few actions that we needed to do. We needed
to change some processes and implement new processes that
were not in place when we needed them. That fell on deaf ears
and we were later further attacked…in total, we were attacked
four times within 6 months.”
HealthSerJU was attacked twice within four months, suffering
ignificantly from both incidents. The IT/Security Manager sug-
ested that both attacks happened because senior management
nderappreciated the IT function of the organisation and did not
rovide enough funding for security until the attacks took place:
14 L. Y. Connolly and D.S. Wall / Computers & Security 87 (2019) 101568 
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C“I think the feeling after both attacks was completely different …
Finally, executive management gave IT a profile that it has never
had before” (HealthSerJU). 
Bailey et al. (2014) stressed that cyber security should be the
responsibility of senior management and they must be actively en-
gaged in this process in order to become cyber-resilient. Senior
management need to ensure that cyber security measures are im-
plemented across all business functions, driving changes in user
behaviour, and endorsing effective governance and reporting in
place ( Bailey et al., 2014 ). Furthermore, Hu et al. (2012) reported
that senior management participation in information security ini-
tiatives had a positive influence on employees’ compliance with
information security policies. Prior research also demonstrated
that a poor security posture of an organisation is directly linked
with the senior management’s failure to understand their role in
the process of implementation security measures ( Kolkowska and
Dhillon, 2013 ). Johnson (2017) , however, concluded that only 30%
of senior business leaders have an in-depth understanding of cy-
ber threats. 
5. Conclusion 
Crypto-ransomware has become a significant threat over the
past several years and the subtle combination of social and tech-
nical factors in its ecosystem makes it particularly harmful. In
this article we have sought out an interdisciplinary understand-
ing of crypto-ransomware by engaging with individuals who had
first-hand experience of either being victims or investigating and
learning from their experiences. The findings demonstrate that
there is no simple remedy, no silver bullet, for such a complex
threat like crypto-ransomware. The attackers are increasingly do-
ing their homework on organisations before they attack and hence
are extremely adaptive in both delivering their ever-developing
ransomware and tailoring their attack vectors to exploit existing
weaknesses within organisations. Successful attacks include psy-
chological trickery, the exploitation of technical shortcomings, ne-
glect by senior management and a shortage of skilled, dedicated
and adaptive front-line managers. 
Our findings also suggest that organisations generally have to
improve their game and be equally adaptive in their responses
to attacks. Some of these findings are to be expected, which the
research confirms, but more importantly the findings illustrate
the nuanced relationship between the technological and social as-
pects of crypto-ransomware and also their relationship with the
organisational setting. As a consequence, our taxonomy of crypto-
ransomware countermeasures shows that a multi-layered approach
is required to protect organisations and make them more resilient
to ransomware attacks, which are increasingly shifting from simple
economic crimes of extortion, to disrupting and even destroying
organisations and the services they provide. 
Our findings, therefore, have important practical implications
for IT and security managers and organisations in general. Al-
though generalisation is not typically an attribute of qualitative re-
search, we feel that the findings (like all qualitative studies) pro-
vide a deep understanding of crypto-ransomware and we believe
that they can be generalised beyond this sample (due to theo-
retical saturation and purposeful sampling techniques). The taxon-
omy provides a blueprint for systematising security measures to
protect organisations against crypto-ransomware attacks – see ‘re-
sponse tools’ in Fig. 3 . Managers can select controls appropriate
to their specific settings, for example, ‘business-use only’ of IT re-
sources is necessary in some organisations while not practical inthers (such as research institutions). Face-to-face security train-
ng, for example, may be more possible in smaller organisations
han large ones. The taxonomy also underlines the importance of
social’ based controls embedded in organisational cultures, rather
han a technical focus to help prevent crypto-ransomware attacks.
ut our respondents also stated that inappropriate measures, skills
nd support led to incidents occurring, some of which were partic-
larly devastating. Furthermore, the taxonomy underlines the cru-
ial role that mid-level managers play in responding to crypto-
ansomware threats. Our plan is, therefore, to convert the taxon-
my into a more user-friendly tool, similar to the Cyber Essentials
elf-assessment instrument ( IASME, 2019 ). When developing the
elf-assessment tool, we will initiate discussions with high-calibre
yber security professionals, including security vendors, practition-
rs and academics. 
The skills set for competent front-line management goes be-
ond being security and IT-savvy. These professionals are required
o be influential mid-level leaders who can change attitudes and
ehaviours in organisations by cultivating certain cultural traits.
herefore, an understanding of the cultural factors and human be-
aviour is necessary to succeed in this role. They must be true
hampions and relentless in their attempts to obtain necessary
unding from senior management. In return, senior management
ust be IT-competent and effectively overlook the IT functions of
n organisation. Senior managers represent an important part of
he security chain in organisations – without an appropriate sup-
ort all efforts of mid-managers will be in vain. Finally, the find-
ngs will assist Police Officers working in CCUs in further under-
tanding the perspective of the victims and also the impacts of
rypto-ransomware. 
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A
ence of the ransomware incident? 
omware took hold? 
ransomware? 
s effective in infecting the network? 
c ransomware policies and training? 
ps? 
rior the attack? 
rus software? 
rience? 
the organisation following the attack? 
A
Code (Phase 1) Category (Phase 2) Theme (Phase 3) Overarching theme 
(Phase 4) 
You are as 
vulnerable as your 
least savvy user 
The weakest link Lack of or 
insufficient 
security education 
Factors that 
enabled infection 
and/or spread 
Aging employee The weakest link Lack of or 
insufficient 
security education 
Factors that 
enabled infection 
and/or spread 
Apathy The weakest link Lack of or 
insufficient 
security education 
Factors that 
enabled infection 
and/or spread ppendix 1. Sample interview questions 
Questions 
Can you please describe the experi
How did you find out that the rans
What was the delivery method of 
Why do you think ransomware wa
Does your organisation have specifi
Does your organisation have backu
Were all applications up-to-date p
Does your organisation use anti-vi
What did you learn from this expe
What changes have been made in 
ppendix 2. An example of an analysis schedule 
Meaning unit(s) Condensed mining 
unit(s) 
In the first instance it starts with users. I have always 
tried to get companies I work with to teach their 
employees that human is the weakest link…You are 
as vulnerable as your least savvy user 
In the first instance it 
starts with users 
Human is the weakest 
link 
You are as vulnerable 
as your least savvy 
user 
It is not being ageist or anything, but the individual 
that initiated infection had not grown up as young 
individuals with computers, they were in 60 s and 
difficulties with dealing with computers 
An individual that 
infected network was 
in 60s 
They had difficulties 
dealing with 
computers 
The user received a malicious email and they should 
not have clicked on it. So that was user education. 
There was a certain amount of apathy. The user said, 
‘It does not matter, it is not going to affect me.’ They 
were not happy with their working environment. 
There was a certain 
amount of apathy 
The user was not 
happy with their 
working environment 
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3.1.3.3 RDP brute-force due to weak password 
3.1.3.4 RDP system is not brilliant 
3.1.3.5 Microsoft ignored our RDP concerns 
3.1.3.6 RDP enabled by default 
3.1.3.7 scanning vulnerable IPs on Internet is simple 
3.1.3.8 vulnerable Internet facing servers 
3.1.4.1 escalated privileges 
3.1.4.2 poor management of admin passwords 
3.1.4.3 infected domain controller 
3.1.4.4 disregard for proper network structures 
3.1.4.5 root access 
3.2.1.1 ransomware came in via vulnerable server 
3.2.1.2 some of our servers were very old 
3.2.1.3 out-of-date software 
3.2.1.4 SMB vulnerability 
3.2.1.5 out-of-date Flash 
3.2.2.1 low-level protection firewall 
3.2.3.1 new malware signature 
3.2.3.2 out-of-date anti-virus 
3.2.3.3 drive-by-download 
3.2.4.1 infection came through browsing Internet 
3.2.5.1 ransomware stayed undetectable for days 
3.3.5.1 signs ‘please do not turn computer on’ 
3.3.5.2 Friday attacks 
3.4.1.1 aging employee 
3.4.1.2 apathy 
3.4.1.3 you are as vulnerable as your least savvy user 
3.4.1.4 convincing email 
3.4.1.5 well-crafted email 
3.4.1.6 it starts with user 
4.1.1.1 a lot of critical systems did not have backups 
4.1.1.2 Time Machine was encrypted 
4.1.1.3 backups got deleted by ransomware 
4.1.1.4 backups were not particularly clever 
4.1.1.5 insufficient backups forced us to pay 
4.1.1.6 servers were not affected, only desktops and 
laptops 
4..1.1.7 backup software was only grabbing chunks of files 
4.1.1.8 sensitive information was encrypted 
4.1.1.9 too many nodes got encrypted 
4.1.1.10 IT provider failed to ensure efficient backups 
4.1.1.11 networked backups 
4.3.1.1 lack of proper funding 
4.3.1.2 IT team is absolutely tiny 
4.3.1.3 too many servers for such small IT team 
4.3.2.1 inappropriate background leading to poor 
governance 
4.3.2.2 senior management incompetence led to further 
infections 
4.3.2.3 not understanding the importance of IT 
4.3.2.4 senior management should have been more 
involved 
4.3.2.5 underappreciation of IT 
4.5.1.1 phone calls from other organisation caused 
disruption 
4.5.1.2 media invasion 
4.5.1.3 security vendors invasion 
4.5.2.1 we did not realise email will be down 
4.5.2.2 we did not have mobile phones of senior 
management 
4.5.2.3 no one thought of IT resources being unavailable 
4.5.3.1 we did not know how to do both investigation 
and recovery Appendix 3. Phase 1 data analysis (open coding) 
1.1.1.1 we responded methodically 
1.1.1.2 processes were documented in the incident 
response plan 
1.1.2.1 we handled media invasion very well 
1.1.2.2 we were able to inform staff immediately 
1.2.1.1 breach coach helped enormously with recovery 
1.2.1.2 cyber insurance provided information we needed 
1.2.1.3 cyber insurance reimbursed many expenses 
1.2.1.4 security vendor was helpful 
1.2.1.5 cyber experts are needed to find patient zero 
1.2.1.6 IT contractors worked very hard 
1.2.1.7 IT contractor decrypted scrambled data 
1.2.1.8 internal staff is the key to successful recovery 
1.2.2.1 timely reporting led to fast reaction to the threat 
1.2.2.2 it is important to let people know what is 
happening 
1.2.2.3 people were compassionate and determined 
1.2.2.4 despite of challenging conditions, people were 
amazing 
1.2.3.1 security-savvy IT manager 
1.2.3.2 knowing what to expect helps 
1.2.3.3 prior experience with attacks helps 
1.3.1.1 early reporting gave us advantage of time 
1.4.1.1 we had sophisticate detection software 
1.4.1.2 anti-virus was up-to-date 
1.4.2.1 we frequently test backups 
1.4.2.2 our offline backups saved us 
2.2.1.1 centrally-managed vulnerability management 
2.2.1.2 scheduled vulnerability management 
2.2.1.3 removing Flash 
2.2.1.4 business applications update 
2.2.2.1 blocking certain attachments and links 
2.2.2.2 email identification 
2.2.2.3 malicious code analysis platform 
2.2.3.1 centrally-controlled upgrades 
2.2.3.2 upgrading legacy systems 
2.2.3.3 OS upgrade 
2.2.4.1 implementation of detection system 
2.2.4.2 monitoring software 
2.2.5.1 advanced protection firewall 
2.2.5.2 securely-configured firewall 
2.2.6.1 testing backups 
2.2.6.2 offline backups 
2.2.7.1 higher protection anti-virus 
2.4.1.1 considering loss of IT 
2.4.1.2 informing staff via text messages 
2.5.1.1 applications roles and responsibilities 
2.5.1.2 least privileges approach 
2.5.2.1 retiring old machines 
2.5.5.1 disabling RDP 
2.5.5.2 robust VPN to replace RDP 
3.1.1.1 we do not know who connects to network 
3.1.1.2 we do not know amount of ransom notes received 
3.1.1.3 no control over upgrading/updating OS 
3.1.1.4 it was like a fog when we got infected 
3.1.2.1 legacy systems could not be upgraded 
3.1.2.2 legacy systems could not be retired 
3.1.3.1 we do not know who connects via RDP 
3.1.3.2 we voluntary enabled RDP 
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